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4 April 1986

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with Captain Jerry Clark, USN, Assistant DNI for Plans and Policy, 3 April 1986

1. I met with Clark in his Pentagon office. He invited another officer (a Captain who was the intelligence chief--the "N-2"--of the 6th Fleet, 1982-84) to sit in. I gave Clark the background to the study and said that Andrew Marshall had suggested that I contact him to get his perspectives.

2. Clark said that the Fleet CINCs frequently referred to the force multiplier concept in their descriptions of successful operations. For example, in the Gulf of Sidra incident good intelligence had precluded the need for a much wider use of combat forces to detect and track Libyan patrol boats and submarines.\* Another example is the Achille Lauro incident wherein good intelligence enabled a much simpler and smaller military operation compared to what could have been the activation of a large Delta Force that was standing by. Nevertheless, a continuing and basic problem for Navy commanders is their inability to process the large volume of data that is generated in a crisis. They therefore have to rely on shore-based "fusion" facilities.

3. The former N-2 commented that in an environment of constrained resources--in an "intelligence vs. force structure" situation--intelligence resources had to be "fenced" because they become more important. This was a line taken by the JCS and that enjoyed high prominence in the JSOPs of the 70s.

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\*In the early stages of the incident, only five of the six Libyan submarines could be accounted for. When the sixth submarine finally was located on 25 March in Yugoslavia, the fleet commander was given an "immense capability to conserve his resources." The CNO has informed all of the fleet CINCs that because of this and other intelligence support, intelligence clearly was a force multiplier in the Gulf of Sidra.

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5. I outlined the next steps for the study, i.e., the Navy and other members of the CIPC would be receiving a memorandum from the Chairman requesting that representatives be named to a working group that I would chair. Included would be a proposed terms of reference for the study for their review and comment. Both officers said they look forward to the study and would ensure an active and constructive participation by the Navy. [REDACTED]

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